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Abstract
This paper shows how uncertainty about liquidity demand can lead
to a high degree of dollarization in the banking system. I study a model
where the demand for currency in each period is random, and where it
is easier for banks to borrow in local currency in times of crisis than
in dollars. Banks choose a portfolio composed of local currency, dollars,
and real loans. Compared to the anticipated transactions demand for each
currency, I show that the bank will hold a relatively large amount of dollars
and a relatively small amount of local currency. I also show the existence
of a dollarization multiplier: as the anticipated transactions demand for
dollars increases, the dollarization of the banking sector increases more
than proportionately.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Much of the recent literature on dollarization has focused on the characteristics
of partially dollarized economies, where dollars and local currency each account
for a substantial fraction of economic transactions. This literature has identi-
ﬁed the degree of dollarization of the banking system as being a particularly
important variable.1 The eﬀects of monetary policy, for example, as well as
the reaction of the economy to external shocks, appear to depend critically on
the degree to which domestic banks choose to denominate their transactions
in dollars. This raises the important question of what determines the level of
dollarization in the banking system.
Most of the existing explanations focus on "liability dollarization," in which
depositors choose to have their deposits denominated in dollars. The literature
is therefore concerned largely with explaining why people would choose to open
dollar-denominated accounts (see Broda and Levy Yeyati [4], Calvo [5], Catão
and Terrones [7], Savastano [19] among others).2 Other explanations have con-
centrated on network externalities that appear when banks’ transactions are
made in foreign currency. A lot of work in this area has been done with regard
to Bolivia, which is one of the main examples of a partially dollarized economy
(see for example Peiers and Wrase [17], Reding and Morales [18] and Cudding-
ton, et al.[9]).3 This work is closely related to the well known phenomenon of
"hysteresis," which was ﬁrst introduced to the study of dollarization issues by
Uribe [23].
In this paper, I concentrate on the other side of a bank’s balance sheet. I
show that uncertainty about liquidity demand will also tend to push a banking
system toward becoming highly dollarized. The model I develop is a general-
ization of Champ, Smith, and Williamson [8].4 I transform their one-currency
model into a two-currency model, introducing the possibility for banks to hold
reserves in either local or foreign currency. Hereafter I will refer to these curren-
cies as pesos and dollars, respectively. In each period, the demand for currency
is stochastic. A fraction of the agents who demand currency will need pesos,
and the remaining fraction will need dollars.
I make the natural assumption that in times of high liquidity demand, it is
easier for a bank to borrow in local currency than in dollars. I show that this
assumption implies that, given some anticipated transactions demand for each
currency, banks will choose to hold a relatively large amount of dollars reserves
and a relatively small amount of reserves in local currency. Uncertainty about
liquidity demand therefore leads to a form of “asset dollarization” in addition
1See, for instance, De Nicoló, et al.[10] who study the beneﬁts and risks associated with
a dollarized banking system and Castro, et al. [6] who analyze the ﬁnancial vulnerability of
partially dollarized economies.
2For a complete review of the literature see Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger [15].
3The Bolivian banking system is highly dollarized, 80% of total assets are in dollars and
liability dollarization is around 90%.
4Antinolﬁ, Huybens and Keister [2], Bhattacharya, Haslag and Rusell [3], Haslag and
Martin [13], Schreft and Smith [20] and Smith [21] also are interesting generalizations, but for
the one-currency model.
2to the liability dollarization studied in other papers.
During a liquidity crisis, a bank will be able to meet the demand for pesos,
since it can borrow pesos from the Central Bank. However this will not be true
for dollar demand. This asymmetry leads a bank to hold a "precautionary" stock
of dollars and the model will show how this is done. In fact it will be shown
that the demand for dollar reserves is in large part driven by "rare events" or
"extreme events". I concentrate ﬁrst on the worst-case scenario, where there
is no possibility for banks to borrow dollars from the Central Bank. I then
generalize the results by introducing the possibility of borrowing in dollars at a
positive interest rate.
The main idea of the model, that banks are self-insuring, is not exclusive
to a dollarized economy or banking system. For example, Antinolﬁ and Keister
[1] show, in a single currency model, how diﬀerent Central Bank policies aﬀect
the equilibrium levels of cash reserves and of real investment held by banks.
However, the question of how banks choose to dollarize their assets has not
been modeled yet in a clear and useful manner, and this paper aims to ﬁll that
gap.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the two-
currency model of money and liquidity demand is developed. Section 3 studies
the equilibria of the model when banks cannot borrow any dollars from the Cen-
tral Bank. The “dollarization multiplier” is deﬁned and derived. In section 4, I
generalize the results to a setting where it is possible for banks to borrow some
dollars from the Central Bank. Finally, in section 5, I present some concluding
remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
In this section I describe the main elements of the model, based on Champ,
Smith and Williamson [8] and modiﬁed in order to address the issue of a partially
dollarized banking system.
2.1 The Environment
This is an overlapping generations model (OLG), where agents live for two
periods and there is an initial old generation. There is a single, perishable
consumption good. At each date t =0 ,1,....., a continuum of agents with unit
mass is born at each of two identical locations (islands). Half of these agents
are “lenders” who have endowments (ω1,ω2)=( x,0), and the other half are
borrowers, who have an endowment vector given by (ω1,ω2)=( 0 ,y).5 The
consumption set for all consumers is R2
++ and their utility function is given by
u(c1,c 2)=l n ( c1)+β ln(c2).T h eﬁrst assumption made is that βx > y holds,
which implies that this is a “Samuelson case” economy (see Gale [12]) and hence
there is a role for money as a store of value. The distinguishing characteristic of
5The fraction of the population in each group is not important; one half is chosen arbitrarily.
All that matters is the total endowment of each group.
3this economy is that there are two currencies in circulation, pesos and dollars,
the former of which is issued by the Central Bank. Agents in the initial old
generation have M>0 units of ﬁat money, all denominated in pesos, the stock
of pesos is assumed to be constant over time.
Both currencies share the role of store of value, but they also share a trans-
actions role which is generated by the random relocation of people between the
two spatially separated islands (see Townsend [22]). This setup allows money to
be dominated in rate of return by other assets. In addition to the two domestic
islands, there is an "outside" or "foreign" island that represents the rest of the
world. A fraction πt of young lenders in each of the domestic islands is notiﬁed
that they will be moved to either the other domestic island or the foreign one.
From the fraction πt of young relocated lenders, a fraction θ will move to the
domestic island and will need pesos, and a fraction 1−θ will move to the foreign
island and will need dollars. In this way a demand for both dollars and domestic
currency is generated. Here, I assume θ>
y
βx; as will become clear later, this
assumption implies that the transaction demand for dollars is never "too large".
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period t,a
new generation of agents is born. Agents receive their endowments and young
lenders can deposit them in a bank or can trade with the old agents. At this
point, agents cannot move between or communicate across locations. Goods
can never be transported between domestic locations. Hence, goods and asset
transactions occur autarkically within each location. Also, young borrowers
can get loans from the bank. There are also risk-sharing issues, because young
lenders do not know whether or not they will be movers (see Diamond and
Dybvig [11]). After deposits have been made, banks have the opportunity to
buy dollars on the international market using goods they have received from
depositors. This market meets only once, before relocation shocks are realized.
After this opportunity has passed, banks are unable to acquire more dollars
until the next period.6 Relocation shocks then are realized, and as people know
where they are going to move, they withdraw either pesos or dollars from their
bank. At the end of period t, relocation actually occurs.
At time t +1 , agents receive their old-age endowments, and borrowers use
part of this endowment to repay their loans. With this revenue, banks make
repayments to lenders who did not move. Old agents can trade with young
lenders and/or banks. At this point, all old agents consume and then die. Note
that the old-age consumption of a mover will always be equal to the real value
of the money that she takes with her to the new location.
The relocation probability πt is a random variable in each period that gives
the size of the aggregate liquidity shock; high values of πt correspond to high
liquidity demand. It has support [0,1) and is drawn from the twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing distribution function zwith associated density
6The timing of events prevents an agent who is located domestically from carrying dollars
to the other location and using them to buy consumption there. The assumptions capture the
idea that dollars are not perfect substitutes for domestic currency; some transactions must
take place in pesos. Alternatively, one could simply assume that domestic movers must use
pesos due to legal restrictions on the use of foreign currency.
4function f. It is independently and identically distributed over time. A higher
πt implies a higher demand for both currencies.
Loans and both types of money are seen as assets for the bank, so the bank
will divide its portfolio between loans, dollars, and pesos, depending on the
return that each asset oﬀers.
The price level pt is determined in the market that meets at the beginning
of the period. In this market, there is no randomness since the bank does not
yet know the realization of πt.A f t e rπt is realized, there are no markets open
until the next period. In a way, this means that liquidity demand is stochastic
in the model, but money demand is not. I also assume that the economy is
small enough that it takes the price of dollars as given by the world market.
This price is normalized to p∗
t =1 .
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers, who never move, face a gross real interest rate of Rt.L e tlt be the
size of the loan demanded. Then they choose the quantity they wish to borrow,
lt, by solving the problem
max
lt
ln(lt)+β ln(y − Rtlt)






Lenders face a more complicated problem. Given that they are faced with
random relocation, they deposit all of their savings in a bank and receive a
return that depends on whether or not they move and, if they move, whether
they are movers in dollars or movers in pesos. Speciﬁcally, they are promised a
real return rt(π) if they do not move, rm
t (π) if they move and demand pesos,
and r∗
t(π) if they move and demand dollars. Lenders then choose the amount






t (π)dt)+( 1− θ)ln(r∗
t(π)dt]+( 1− π)ln(rt(π)dt)}f(π)dπ





It has to be noted that the income and substitution eﬀects of a change in
t h er a t eo fr e t u r ne x a c t l yo ﬀset each other; this fact clearly depends on the
assumption of log utility and no old-age income for lenders. As in Champ et al.
[8] and others, this assumption allows the model to be solved analytically.
52.4 Banks
Banks take deposits, make loans, hold reserves, announce return schedules and
can borrow pesos from the Central Bank at a zero interest rate (if needed).
I assume that banks can only borrow in local currency. This assumption is
somewhat strong, in reality banks can usually borrow some amount of dollars.
However, I show below that relaxing this assumption and allowing banks to
borrow dollars at a positive nominal interest rate does not change the results.7
Borrowers can write loan contracts with any bank and banks behave com-
petitively in the sense that they take the real return on assets as given. On the
deposit side, banks are assumed to behave as Nash competitors, which leads
them to choose state-contingent deposit returns to maximize the expected util-
ity of young lenders. Let’s introduce some notation about the variables that
will be important for the bank:
Notation 1 zt = real value of cash reserves per depositor in pesos; z∗
t=r e a l
value of cash reserves per depositor in dollars; dt − zt = real value of loans
made per depositor in pesos; dt − z∗
t = real value of loans made per depositor
in dollars; γt = zt






dollars; δt = bt






borrowing per unit of deposits in dollars.
The bank faces three constraints on the return schedules it can oﬀer. Relo-
cated agents must be given pesos or dollars, since this is the only asset which
will allow these agents to consume in their new locations. These currencies come
from the bank’s reserve holdings and from borrowing from the Central Bank.
Let αt(π) denote the fraction of the bank’s peso reserves that is given to movers
and α∗
t(π) the fraction of the bank’s dollar reserves that is given to movers. As
pt is the general price level at time t,
pt+1
pt is the return to holding pesos between
time t and t+1. The return on holding dollars is, by assumption, one. The next
two equations are the constraints for movers in pesos and in dollars respectively
and the third one is the constraint for non-movers.
πθrm





















The left hand sides of equations (3) and (4) represent the total real value of
goods that will be given to movers in pesos and in dollars respectively. Equation
7See Morales [16] for a discussion of a Central Bank charging punitive interest rates on its
lender-of-last-resort loans.
6(5) is the payment to non-movers, which cannot exceed the value of the bank’s
remaining portfolio of reserves plus the returns from the bank’s lending minus
the repayment of the Central Bank’s loan. Note that the bank’s loans earn the
real rate of return Rt.
















pt +( 1− α∗
t(π))γ∗
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subject to 0 ≤ αt(π) ≤ 10 ≤ γt ≤ 10 ≤ δt(π)
0 ≤ α∗
t(π) ≤ 10 ≤ γ∗
t ≤ 1
Notice that (i) the fraction of peso reserves paid to movers αt, (ii) the fraction
of dollar reserves paid to movers α∗
t, and (iii) the real amount of borrowing in
pesos δt, are all chosen after the realization of π. On the other hand, γt and
γ∗
t, the fraction of reserves in the bank’s asset portfolio, is chosen before the
realization of π.
First, one can note that when the realized value of π is small, banks will give
only a fraction of their cash reserves to movers and the inequality constraints







































This solution is valid as long as the inequality constraints are indeed satisﬁed,















Then, for a low value of π, speciﬁcally for values of π ∈ [0,π∗],t h ev a l u e so f







t + Rt(1 − γt − γ∗
t) (9)
This means that when the demand for liquidity is low (the relocation shock
is below a critical value π∗), the bank is able to give movers of both currencies
and non-movers the same return by paying out only a fraction of its reserves
to movers. Since the bank wants to provide lenders with insurance against the
relocation shock, this is the optimal thing to do.
7Next, if π is greater than π∗, we know that the α =1constraint will be
binding. That is, the bank will be giving all of its peso reserves to movers, and
may need to borrow additional pesos from the Central Bank, so δ>0.I nt h i s






























What is interesting here, and it is straightforward to prove, is that even for
values of π greater than π∗, the bank will again choose to guarantee the same







t + Rt(1 − γt − γ∗
t) (12)
In other words, for larger values of π (the relocation shock is beyond the
critical value π∗) the bank is also able to provide lenders with insurance against
the relocation shock, by oﬀering them the same return. How could this be
possible? The answer is that the bank can always borrow in pesos, so if people
come to the bank and ask for pesos, the bank will satisfy everybody. This is
intuitive since we can think that the Central Bank is always able to print local
currency to satisfy the demand of the movers in pesos. Things become diﬃcult
for the bank when the proportion of movers in dollars who come to the bank is
large.
Finally banks will then set γt and γ∗
t to maximize the return on the bank’s
portfolio which is given by the right hand of equation (9) or (12). The optimal
























and for the optimal reserve-deposit ratio in dollars, we have to compare the























So at the time a bank has to decide in which assets to invest, it will compare
the returns of the three possibilities (pesos, loans and dollars). What if
pt+1
pt =
Rt < 1 ? Recall that γt +γ∗
t ≤ 1 must hold always, so if this is the case γ∗
t will
be equal to one and γt will be equal to zero, so the bank will prefer to hold all
of its assets in dollars.
83 Equilibrium Conditions
An equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the market clearing condi-
tions for real balances in local currency and loans. Because the supply of real
balances is equal to M
pt and the demand for real balances in pesos is given by





Similarly, the demand for loans is given in (1), while the supply of loans
is given by (1 − γt − γ∗




=( dt − zt − z∗
t)=( 1− γt − γ∗





To solve for the equilibrium we are going to use the assumption about θ made
before, which implies that a large enough proportion of movers will demand
pesos. This, and deﬁning a critical value of θ as θ ≡
y
βx, gives us the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 If θ>θ ≡
y




βx and γ∗ ≥ 1 − θ.
Proof. From the equilibrium condition (14), we have that (1−γt−γ∗
t)Rt =
y
βx. In equilibrium we know that Rt =1 ,t h e n(1−γt−γ∗
t)=
y
βx.F r o me q u a t i o n
(13) we know that γt could never be equal to zero, since this would imply that
pt =0 , this would mean that pesos have no value, and nobody would have the
incentive to hold pesos at all. So we have to look for a solution where both γt
and γ∗
t satisfy the equilibrium conditions and it is straightforward to see that
the solutions proposed for γ and γ∗satisfy them. In order to prove that this is
an equilibrium we need to verify also that α∗
t(π) in (11) is less than (or equal
to) one for all possible values of π. In fact using the equilibrium conditions, it
can be shown that α∗
t(π =1 )≤ 1 if and only if γ∗ ≥ 1 − θ.8 (Q.E.D.)
Therefore, what I have proved is that when it is assumed that banks cannot












9It remains to show how the bank will make its choice between γ and γ∗ or
how many reserves it will hold in pesos and in dollars. As stated above, the
bank will hold enough dollars to cover the worst possible case, as it knows that
the Central Bank will not lend them any dollars in any case. In this way, when
θ>θ the bank will set γ∗ ≥ 1 − θ and 0 ≤ γ ≤ θ −
y
βx.
This is a case of continuum of steady state equilibria, which is a common re-
sult in OLG models with two currencies. This result was shown ﬁrst by Kareken
and Wallace [14] where, in equilibrium, both currencies are perfect substitutes
in some sense. They also showed exchange rate indeterminacy, something also
present in my model: in the diﬀerent stationary equilibria, the real value of a
peso is diﬀerent and therefore the exchange rate is diﬀerent.
I focus on the "minimal dollarization" equilibrium, where γ∗ =1− θ.T h e
next proposition shows that, even in this equilibrium, the equilibrium level of
dollarization in the banking system is large relative to the transactions demand
for dollars. All other (stationary) equilibria involve the bank holding an even
larger quantity of dollars and, therefore, the results holds in an even stronger
sense there. In the minimal dollarization equilibrium, we have γ = θ −
y
βx and
we can deﬁne Ψ as the "level of dollarization", that is, as the ratio of the real
value of dollar reserves to the real value of all cash reserves.
Ψ =
γ∗
γ + γ∗ (16)
The following proposition states the main result of the paper:
Proposition 2 As the demand of dollars increases, the dollarization of the
banking system increases more than proportionately, i.e.
¯ ¯∂Ψ
∂θ
¯ ¯ > 1.
Proof. Substituting the minimal dollarization equations for γ and γ∗ in
equation (16), we get Ψ = 1−θ
1−
y
βx . It is easy to see that ∂Ψ






¯ ¯ > 1.(Q.E.D.)
Ic a l l∂Ψ
∂θ the "dollarization multiplier". The fact that this multiplier is larger
than one shows clearly that the dollarization of the banking system grows faster
than the transaction demand for dollars. In other words, as θ → θ =⇒ γ → 0
and so γ∗ → 1−
y
βx. In terms of the multiplier, this means that Ψ → 1 as θ → θ.
This is a new explanation for a dollarized banking system, based on liquidity
shocks and precautionary demand.
Let us see what the model says about the relation between asset and lia-
bilities in dollars. Is there something that can explain why, in terms of levels,
banks might have more assets in dollars than liabilities? Although it is not the
primary aim of the model, the following corollary says something about it.
Corollary 1 In a stationary equilibrium, banks will hold more assets in dollars
than liabilities.
Proof. Equation (12) shows that in a stationary equilibrium, real return
parity holds. Since Rt =1and pt+1 = pt, it can be seen that all movers receive
10a return of one, regardless of whether they need pesos or dollars and regardless
of the realization of π. We can call this return the "equilibrium return on early
withdrawals". In this way dollar liabilities will be equal to (1 − θ) × 1.T h e n
substituting for γ and γ∗ in the dollarization multiplier –equation (16)– and




βx > 1 − θ.( Q . E . D )
The deﬁnition of liabilities given above is analogous to the way that the
liabilities of a real bank would be deﬁned: What has the bank "promised" to
people if they all demand to withdraw early? Of course, not everyone will
attempt to withdraw early; some people will be non-movers and will wait until
the next period to withdraw.
It remains to talk about what happens when θ is below θ.I nt h i ss i t u a t i o n
γ∗ < 1 − θ, thus banks will ocassionally run out of dollars. This means the
solution to the bank’s problem will now be diﬀerent; the bank will want to hold
even more dollars (for precautionary purposes). But then there is no demand
for reserves in local currency, and therefore pesos will have no value. Restoring
the existence of equilibrium in this case would require modifying the model in
some way in order to generate a lower bound for the demand for pesos. Such
modiﬁcations are beyond the scope of the present paper and are left for future
research.
4 Generalizing the results
Finally, I am going to relax the assumption about not borrowing dollars from
the Central Bank and instead suppose that banks can indeed borrow dollars,
but at a “penalty rate”.9 By a “penalty rate,” I mean that the interest rate
on borrowing in dollars is higher than the market rate. As Morales [16] says,
it is an interest rate that makes banks believe that Central Bank liquidity is
expensive.10
In this case the bank’s constraints will be given by:
πθrm




























t is the interest rate for borrowing in dollars. The maximization
problem will be:
9I will continue to assume that banks can borrow local currency at a zero interest rate.
10Morales [16] also talks about banks believing that Central Bank liquidity is of diﬃcult
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pt +( 1− α∗
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    
    
f(π)dπ
subject to 0 ≤ αt(π) ≤ 10 ≤ γt ≤ 10 ≤ δt(π)
0 ≤ α∗
t(π) ≤ 10 ≤ γ∗
t ≤ 10 ≤ δ
∗
t(π)
Proposition 3 When banks can borrow dollars at a positive interest rate, the
equilibria of the model are unchanged. In particular for values of π ∈ [0,π∗]
the solutions for α and α∗ are given by equations (6) and (7) and for values of
π ∈ [π∗,1] the solutions for δ and α∗are given by equations (10) and (11).
Proof. Following the same reasoning as in part 3.4, the ﬁrst order conditions



























































As long as borrowing in dollars is even a little bit more expensive than borrowing
in pesos, the bank will still want to hold enough dollars to cover the worst-case
scenario, so that it will never have to borrow dollars. That is, the bank will
always choose δ
∗ =0 , because this type of borrowing is costly. Then substituting
δ
∗ =0in equations (20) and (21), we get exactly the same equations (6) and
(7). It is clearly shown that for the second part α =1 , δ>0 and δ
∗ =0 ,s ow e
get equations (10) and (11). (Q.E.D.)
Note that again for all values of π, the bank would be able to guarantee
the same return to people (see equation 12) and propositions 1 and 2 still hold.
In this way, it is seen that the results hold not only in the case where borrowing
in dollars is impossible, but also in more general cases.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
I have studied a pure-exchange economy in which spatial separation, limited
communication and random relocation combine to create an environment for
analyzing the dollarization of the banking system. It has been shown that
banks will hold relatively large positions in dollars compared to the transactions
demand for dollars. The results are the same whether the banks are unable to
borrow dollars from the Central Bank or this type of borrowing is possible but
costly. In either case, banks will choose to hold enough dollars to cover the worst
case scenario; in other words, the ﬁrst line of defense, in case of a liquidity crisis,
will be provided by the banks themselves.
12It has been shown also that dollarization of the banking system increases
faster than the demand for dollars, and this is an equilibrium as long as θ ∈ £
θ,1
¤
.I f θ is much larger than θ, banks could be holding a lot of pesos. The
model shows, however, that the dollarization of the banking system will be
surprisingly high relative to the dollarization of the whole economy. That, is
1 − θ could be interpreted as a measure of what transactions are carried in
dollars. In theory, it could be small or large, but whatever 1−θ is, the banking
system will be more dollarized than that because of the dollarization multiplier.
The model has been presented assuming that banks cannot borrow any dol-
lars from the Central Bank, or can borrow but at a penalty rate. The latter case
allows for more general results. In a crisis situation, when there is a shortage of
dollars, it seems natural for a “dollar premium” to emerge (that is, for dollars
to be at least slightly more expensive for a bank to get), especially if the Central
Bank is using up all (or almost all) of its reserves in order to act as a liquidity
insurer for the banking system.
Finally, I must mention that the model can be compared using country data.
If someone looks at the data generated by the model, in each period, she would
observe the realized demand for pesos and the realized demand for dollars. Just
looking at that data, the banking system will probably appear to be "overly"
dollarized. That is, it is likely that there will be realizations of the variable π
that are above π∗, so that sometimes the bank will run out of pesos and need
to borrow. But there will probably not be any realizations of π that are very
close to 1. So even though the bank is occasionally running out of pesos, the
bank will always have a stock of dollars around that it is not using. Why is the
bank so "attached" to holding dollars even when there are regular shortages of
pesos? The model tells us the answer: the demand for dollars is driven by "rare
events" or the worst-case scenario. If we observe data from a period in which
the worst case did not happen, the data will be "biased" in a sense.
Dollarization will be costly to the banks, insofar that they have to maintain
more liquidity in dollars. It would be interesting to see how this could aﬀect
ﬁnancial intermediation, the quantity of loans given, and the level of economic
activity. These issues are left for future research.
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